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ECONOMIC CONSULTANTS

External Evaluation of Programme Activities Fostering the Geneva Initiative

FINAL REPORT

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External evaluation of programme activities fostering the Geneva Initiative

carried out on behalf of Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

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Executive Summary

The Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has been supporting the Geneva Initiative (GI) both financially and non-financially since 2003. In the region, two NGOs were part of the FDFA-supported programme (PPC in the Palestine Occupied Territories and Heskem in Israel). Almost six years after the official signing of the Geneva Accords, the FDFA has commissioned an external evaluation of the activities fostering the GI. As an overall conclusion, the evaluation confirms that the support of the programme activities was justified. The evaluation also outlines three options on how to proceed in future; a majority of the evaluation team suggests phasing out Swiss support for the GI within the years to come.

Methodology: The evaluation first analyses the programme along the categories "objectives", "input", "process", "output", and "impact". Based on that, conclusions are drawn; the conclusions are structured according to the standard *DAC criteria* (relevance, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, impact). Information for the evaluation was taken from FDFA documents and obtained through semi-structured interviews in Switzerland (Geneva, Berne, Basel and Zurich), Israel (Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), and Palestine (Ramallah).

The *relevance* of the GI varied during the last six years. The GI lost some of its initial momentum about two years after signing of the Geneva Accords and regained importance two years ago, especially since early 2008. The evaluation team considers it appropriate to continue the support based on the relevance criteria.

The *sustainability* analysis is based on looking at the organisational and financial setup of two NGOs and by assessing the goal of the GI. The financial support provided by other donors to the GI and the two NGOs is substantial, but without Switzerland's core financing, both NGOs would not be financially sustainable. There is no evidence that any other donor would provide similar kind of support at this point in time. The GI spirit is sustainable in the sense that the essence of the GA and annexes will continue to be a reference point for future peace negotiations independent of the continued existence of the two NGOs.

Overall, the *effectiveness* of the programmes put in place and financed by the FDFA is good on the Israeli side and fair on the Palestinian side. The support of Heskem is justified based on effectiveness considerations. The evaluators advise the FDFA to be more selective in regard to PPC activities as not all of them are effective. The fact that Switzerland provides the overwhelming share of core fund-

ing for both organisations limits Switzerland's ability to support selective projects only.

The overall *efficiency* of the programme activities is good on the Israeli side and fair on the Palestinian side. The staff members of both NGOs are dedicated and the current organisational structure allows for efficient processes. PPC's salary payment of Mr Rabbo's security personnel does not generate direct outputs and he has been in need for protection even without his support for the GI. Hence, it appears that this salary payment is not the most efficient use of financial resources provided by FDFA. Instead of full payment for Mr. Rabbo's security needs, FDFA resources could be applied as a top-off payment (additional) not as a full payment since the PLO secretariat has to provide security services anyhow to its leading functionaries.

Political *impact* of the GI was achieved, although sometimes in an undesired direction (e.g. Gaza disengagement by Sharon). In Israeli media and to a lesser extent in the Palestinian media, the GI is a regular topic. International journalists do remember the accords and cite them in general "peace in the Middle East"-articles too. Overall, the PPC interventions had no major observable impact.

The biggest room for *improvement* lies in the field of effectiveness.

- Heskem should try to think of different ways to approach the US Jewish community. The NGO does possess a remarkable network and is encouraged to make better use of its network when identifying a viable and effective Heskem representative in the United States.
- The broad and general PR campaigns should be stopped in Palestine. First, because two-thirds of the Palestinians are already in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and second because PPC does not appear inclined to forcefully discuss delicate topics from a GA point of view such as the refugees issue. PPC should instead focus its efforts on GA/GI advocacy work in the Arab world.
- The reconciliation activities of Fatah and Hamas should not be run by PPC as a stand-alone organisation as there are many Palestinians linking the GI (and for that matter the PPC if known at all) with Yasser Abed Rabbo who often speaks very adamantly against the Hamas. PPC could be more effectively promoting the GI in Palestine if acting in conjunction with other like-minded Palestinian NGOs.

- The polling activity should be reduced overall and be more targeted to direct GI-related questions, the questionnaire should remain unchanged during a longer time span to allow comparisons over time.
- The choice of target groups must correspond to the time horizon of the donors. Programmes with long-term impact horizon should only be continued if the core funding is likely to be provided from a mid- to long-term perspective.

Finally, the consultants lay out three scenarios namely (i) the FDFA either stops its funding immediately, (ii) Switzerland gradually phases out its support, or (iii) Switzerland generally strengthens its support with even more financial resources while making necessary changes suggested in this report.

To immediately stop any funding is not recommended by the evaluators. A minority of the evaluators thinks that the FDFA should increase their financial support while implementing the recommendations in this report. A majority of the evaluators encourage the FDFA to phase out their financial support in the next two to three years after supporting the dissemination of the GA annexes in the coming years.

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List of Abbreviations

CPA	Certified Public Accountant
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
FDFA	Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GA	Geneva Accord
GI	Geneva Initiative
GIC	Geneva Initiative Committee
GIN	Geneva Initiative Network
HDC	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
Heskem	H.L. Education for Peace Ltd. – The Geneva Initiative – Yes to an Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
ORP	Official Representative of the Party
PA	Palestinian National Authority
PA II	Political Affairs Division II
PA IV	Political Affairs Division IV
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMC	Palestinian Media Center
PPC	Palestinian Peace Coalition / Geneva Initiative

PPP	Palestinian People's Party
PR	Public Relations
PWC	PriceWaterhouseCoopers
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
WB	West Bank

1 Introduction

The aim of this evaluation of the activities fostering the Geneva Initiative is to document the work that has been done and to re-examine the Swiss financial and non-financial support of it.

1.1 Background

In the course of the Israeli-Palestinian¹ conflict, many peace initiatives have been launched. Probably, the most promising one was the Oslo Accord of 1993 which ensured relative peace for almost seven years. However, after the failures of both the second Camp David negotiations (2000) and the Taba summit (2001), prominent Israeli and Palestinian personalities felt the need for a new initiative. In autumn 2001 they jointly started a process of finding a blueprint for a permanent status agreement addressing all key issues whose previous inexistence is considered to be one of the main causes for eventual failure of the Oslo Accord of 1993. The leading figures behind these efforts are the former Israeli minister of justice, Dr. Yossi Beilin, and Yasser Abed Rabbo, secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The negotiations finally led to the Geneva Accord (hereinafter called GA) on the October 12th 2003 which was presented to the public at large during the official ceremony in Geneva on the 1st of December 2003.

The Swiss government has been facilitating the secret talks through Prof. Alexis Keller, which ultimately were leading to the Geneva Accord (see below) as well as the broader concept of the Geneva Initiative (hereinafter called GI). The GI in essence combines two great hopes. On one side there is the knowledge that a solution exists and on the other hand both peoples are aware that a significant part of the civil society on the other side is open to a dialogue and willing to compromise in the course of negotiations. Together these hopes contradict the often-heard opinion that there is "no partner and no plan" and hence that a negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians cannot be reached.

The Quartet on the Middle East presented the Road Map to Peace in mid 2002 while the almost two years of secret discussions for a detailed blueprint for an Israel-Palestinian permanent peace and status agreement were still going on. Although the Road Map suggests a phase three in which the remaining key issues

¹ Throughout the report we will use Israel and Palestine (and all the similar adverbs and adjective) in alphabetical order.

should be solved, it did not give – as none of all the previous peace initiatives did – any indication how a comprehensive solution might look like. Conversely, the GA does not provide a path² on how to achieve the gradual implementation of the model solution but rather defines the outline of the key components of a final two-state solution.

1.2 The Geneva Accord (GA)

The GA can consequently be seen to be complementary to the Road Map and the other preceding step-by-step approaches like the Oslo process. The key added-value of the GA is to show the world – and especially the Israeli and Palestinian peoples – what a final agreement can look like and consists of in detail. Metaphorically speaking the GA represents the light at the end of the tunnel.

The GA consists of one key overall objective (article 1) – which is an end of conflict and an end of all claims – and inter alia answers to the six most controversial issues, namely

Art. 2 Mutual recognition

As part of the accord, the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to their own state and recognize the State of Israel as their national home. Conversely, the Israelis recognize the Palestinian state as the national home of the Palestinian people.

Art. 3 Implementation and Verification Group

An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall be established to facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of the agreement. As part of the IVG, a Multinational Force (MF) shall be established to provide security guarantees to the parties. To perform the functions specified in this agreement, the MF shall be deployed in the state of Palestine.

Art. 4 Territory

- (i) The border marked on a detailed map is final and indisputable.
- (ii) According to the accord and maps, the extended borders of the State of

² The annexes to the GA which were published in June 2009 contain some more details on the path itself.

Israel will include Jewish settlements currently beyond the Green Line, Jewish neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, and territories with significance for security surrounding Ben Gurion International Airport. These territories will be annexed to Israel on agreement and will become inseparable from it.

(iii) In return to the annexation of land beyond the 1967 border, Israel will hand over alternative land to the Palestinian, based on a 1:1 ratio. The lands annexed to the Palestinian State will be of equal quality and quantity.

Art. 5 Security

Palestine and Israel shall each recognize and respect the other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from the threat or acts of war, terrorism and violence. Both sides shall prevent the formation of irregular forces or armed bands, and combat terrorism and incitement. Palestine shall be a non-militarized state, with a strong security force.

Art. 6 Status of Jerusalem

(i) The parties shall have their mutually recognized capitals in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.

(ii) The Jewish neighbourhoods of Jerusalem will be under Israeli sovereignty, and the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem will be under Palestinian sovereignty.

(iii) The parties will commit to safeguarding the character, holiness, and freedom of worship in the city.

(iv) The parties view the Old City as one whole enjoying a unique character. Movement within the Old City shall be free and unimpeded subject to the provisions of this article and rules and regulations pertaining to the various holy sites.

(v) There shall be no digging, excavation, or construction on al-Haram al-Sharif / the Temple Mount, unless approved by the two parties.

(vi) A visible colour-coding scheme shall be used in the Old City to denote the sovereign areas of the respective Parties.

(vii) Palestinian Jerusalemites who currently are permanent residents of Israel shall lose this status upon the transfer of authority to Palestine of those areas in which they reside.

Art. 7 Resolution to the Palestinian refugee problem

The agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, under which refugees will be entitled to compensation for their refugee status and for loss of property, and will have the right to return to the State of Palestine. The refugees could also elect to remain in their present host countries, or relocate to third countries, among them Israel, at the sovereign discretion of third countries.

Although Yasser Arafat praised the GI just prior to the opening ceremony in Dec. 1st 2003 to be courageous and although members of the PLO participated in the development of the GA, no official support was extended to the GA by government officials of either side. On the contrary, especially the Israeli government deemed the initiative to be ingérence into a sovereign country's prerogative right and hence rejected it outright.

1.3 The Geneva Initiative (GI)

The GI is a framework with the GA at its core. The goal of the GI is to serve as a forum for peace-oriented Israelis and Palestinians and to promote the idea of the GA. For this purpose two non-profit organisations (Heskem and the Palestinian Peace Coalition) were created to promote the spirit of the GI locally as well as internationally. After four years these both NGOs acquired the necessary funds to work on the annexes to the GA which – with the exception of three annexes – were completed after 18 months of intense deliberation and drafting. This work together with a new administration in the United States of America gives the GI activists the opportunity to reiterate and extend the GI message to the respective domestic and international communities.

1.4 FDFA's Contribution

Switzerland initially supported the GI by providing financial and non-financial support to Prof. Keller who facilitated the talks leading to the GA. Thereafter, Switzerland organised the official opening GI ceremony on December 1st 2003. Subsequently, the FDFA funded the activities fostering the GI with around two millions until 2006 and with one million until now.

1.5 Track 1 vs. Track 2 Initiatives

Third-party interventions can be undertaken by an official organization or institution, e.g. a national government, an inter-governmental organization such as the United Nations, or a supra-national organization such as the European Union. Such official third party involvement is called Track I peace intervention. On the other hand, third-party interventions can also be proposed by non-official organizations such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations), be they profit oriented (e.g. consultancy firms) or not-for-profit (e.g. foundations, faith-based organizations, religious groups etc) also called Track II intervention.

Applied to the current conflict, Heskem could be considered a Track II intervention since none of their current staff are Israeli government officials while PPC is in between Track I and Track II in light of the fact that its director is close to the Palestinian authorities and has participated in most of the PA's negotiations while at the same time keeping a direct link in the PPC which is a Palestinian NGOs, hence a Track II organisation. The two NGOs are in this regard not of equal political weight. One could hence label the two NGOs as representing a Track I to Track 2 peace initiative supported by Switzerland, a Track I mediator.

1.6 Evaluation Methodology

1.6.1 Evaluation Framework


This evaluation covers the time period from late 2003 until now and is based on the OECD-DAC criteria, which are:

- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Impact
- Sustainability

The questions associated with the DAC criteria are answered through the team's evaluation approach. In structuring the evaluation, we follow a more recent

evaluation methodology designed for the evaluation of political programmes (see graphic on the next page).

This evaluation design has the advantage of showing a) the logical interactions between the objective, the input, the process, output variables, impact and outcome and b) also gives a logical and sequential framework to the evaluation process itself.



1.6.2 Evaluation Steps

Following the different steps shown in the graphic above, the aim, results and associated activities are outlined below.

Goal / Objective

The aim of this first step is to describe what the goal of the FDFA-supported activities was, taking into account the changes that were made during the period 2003-2009. To this end, documents have been analysed and interviews conducted to clarify both the FDFA's and the beneficiaries' perception of the goals and possible shifts of emphasis over time.

Input

On the GI message level the *relevance* of the underlying idea has been assessed in light of the changing context. Analogue, the *sustainability* of the message is vetted by analysing the general robustness of the GI long-term solution in a constantly changing political environment.

On the organisational level, the aim of this evaluation was to obtain an overall picture on all resources received by the two organisations supported by FDFA. Relevant resources are financial contributions and in-kind contributions such as logistical support. The contributions have been analysed by year and organisation. Also, inputs by third parties have been taken into account to show leverage effects of the FDFA support and to indicate the extent of GI's dependence on Swiss support. The latter can be interpreted as a measure of *sustainability* of the GI in the sense of self-reliance. This information was obtained from both FDFA controlling and annual reports from the two organisations.

Process / Organisation

GI idea level: How is the programme organised? Was the most suitable process selected? As a result of this analysis, an answer is provided to the question whether the programme setup, the process and the organisation of the program have been *effective*.

Organisational level: The organisational structure of the beneficiaries has been outlined and different activities have been listed and discussed. As a result, a first assessment can be reached as for the *efficiency* of the two GI organisations.

Activities / Output

The GI activities are summarised in this report, showing the prime output parameters such as number of participants at seminars and conferences. This step relies heavily on data provided by the beneficiaries. As far as possible, the quality of the data was cross-checked and the output parameters were giving indications in regard to the *efficiency* of the programme.

Impact / Outcome

Modern evaluation theory differentiates between impact and outcome. Following this convention, the idea dimension was separated the GI message targeted at the groups in the political discourse (impact) from the changes in the external attitude (outcome), while cumulating both aspects on the organisational level to match the DAC criteria terminology better. The overall aim was to evaluate, if and to what extend the programme has achieved its goals as detailed and confirmed in the first step of the evaluation. The most critical part of this step was to isolate programme effects from more general societal and political developments. Often, a programme will have contributed to a certain development, but other trends and activities of other organisations might have supported (or counteracted) the effects of the programme. As result, we discuss to what extend the net *impact / outcome* of the programme can be described and assessed.

1.6.3 Sources

The evaluation was based on two main sources – written documents and individual interviews ranging from one to five hours. Starting point were the written documents provided by the FDFA (Band 5-21 plus two additional folders). They were amended by documents that were requested from three main actors, namely the HD centre and the two partner organisations (Heskem, PPC).

In order to get a broad picture of the activities fostering the GI and their effects a series of interviews have been conducted. The interviewees range from current and former FDFA personnel to university professors, foreign ambassadors, international organisation personnel, members of the press, members of parliament, and partner organisation staff members or key affiliates. The interviews were conducted in person both in Switzerland (Geneva, Berne, Basel, Zurich, Interlaken) and in the field (Israel and OPT). In addition, some interviews needed to be done by phone. For the complete list of interview see appendix A.

2 Objectives

This section analyses the different objectives and goals of the various actors. The FDFA's goals are highlighted. Thereafter the objective of the two partner organisations and the intermediate actor (GIC) are presented. Thereby two questions are addressed. First, the external objectives, i.e. of the two partner NGOs and of the GIC, are checked against the FDFA goals and second, shifts within the objectives (or a lack thereof) are documented and appraised in the context of a changed political environment. The overall importance of this section, however, is to provide the basis of the check for effectiveness in the sense of activities fostering the GI complying with the goals set for the two partner organisations.

2.1 FDFA Goals

2.1.1 Initial FDFA Goals

The original goals in the FDFA documents have been laid out by the initial facilitator of the GA secret talks, Alexis Keller, on October 31st 2003. As for the Israeli side he argued that the "main Goals [are]

1. To keep the Geneva Initiative in the centre of the public debate [...] (3 years and more, if necessary).
2. To launch a large-scale public initiative, based on popular support of the agreement.
3. To broaden the circles & sectors of support in society and to activate volunteer supporters in ways that express the wide support for the initiative.
4. To educate the public on the possible content and possibility of an agreement.
5. To increase public support [in Israel and OPT] and reach a support rate of over 50%.
6. To run a campaign well coordinated, and in certain points combined, with the Palestinians.

7. To encourage the Israeli leadership to move forward in the peace process, and eventually adopt the Geneva agreement as a basis for a real final status agreement with the Palestinians.
8. To increase public understanding on permanent status issues and facilitate dissemination of information to future negotiators and relevant exports."

Seven out of eight points are fairly broadly phrased and hence a measurement of degree of achievement is very difficult. The only quantifiable item is the fifth goal of reaching a public support rate of over 50%. However, we argue in section 6.5 that polling the public acceptance of Geneva Accord like solutions is a problematic measure of success in the context of ever changing political setting.

An additional FDFA goal raised by interviewed diplomats has been that the GI provided privileged access to key personalities in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.1.2 Shift in FDFA Goals in 2004

More than nine months after the official signing of the GA an internal FDFA document reassessed the GI and motivated the FDFA support for at least another two years by suggesting that

1. GA is in accordance with the FDFA's notion of a fair-minded peace solution
2. the GI secures important diplomatic access for Switzerland, and
3. GA is a key reference document for any peace solution in the Middle East. The last part can be interpreted as representing the ultimate test for any continuation of support because Switzerland's notion of what a fair-minded peace solution is unlikely to change drastically. The diplomatic opportunities on the other hand are not primarily GI content driven.

In addition to the above praise for the goals achieved, concern was voiced over the fulfilment of FDFA objective to see a local public debate in Israel and Palestine. It is stated that "international hat die GI Erfolg (siehe letztes GIN Treffen in Brüssel). Lokal ist die GI nicht verankert und wird nicht öffentlich diskutiert" This

remark obviously also means that the international goodwill towards the GI is a key objective to the FDFA.

The overall FDFA goal after the first year of dissemination can be summarised as the GI becoming a reference point for the general public, the media, the decision makers and decision shapers (e.g. think tanks), and the international community. This development is exemplified by the list below of five objectives in 2005 of which only the first point does not primarily aim at the GI to become a reference point of some sort.

1. Proving that at least one plausible solution exists
2. Reference point for public and media
3. Becoming part of the diplomatic lingua-franca
4. Widely used by key public figures on all sides
5. Basis for think tanks

2.1.3 Shift in FDFA Goals in 2007

The latest officially documented shift in the FDFA strategy occurred in late 2007 at the time of the Annapolis conference as well as of the four year anniversary of the GI. A FDFA document stated that a majority of the people support the ideas proposed by the GI but due to some people's negative reaction to Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo, a broad open support of the GI is unlikely. In addition, the Annapolis conference with its public consensus that a two-state solution will be part of a final solution deprived the GI of a main selling point. Consequently, the FDFA redefined its objectives as follows:

1. Post-Annapolis context and GI partner activities.
A renewal of discussions about the critical points of the conflict was expected and the two GI partner were advised to prepare themselves for it.
2. Link with Arab Peace Initiative.
"[...] Il serait ainsi utile de reprendre les consultations avec la Ligue arabe afin de voir si des synergies sont possible [...]."
3. Finish the annexes.

2.1.4 Shift in FDFA Goals in 2009

The FDFA's last objective – finishing the annexes – has almost been achieved recently. The completion of all but three annexes (refugees, prisoners, electromagnetic sphere) as well as a new US administration and new Israeli government in office require new FDFA goals. Interviews conducted as part of this evaluation suggest that these newly revised goals have been elaborated and implemented albeit not in a formal manner.

2.2 Heskem Objectives

The Israeli NGO's objectives are all based on the various Kreditanträge from November 11th 2003 until March 25th 2008. The objectives and their development are depicted in table 1.

Table 1: Main Heskem objectives in chronological order of occurrence

14.11.2003	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Keep the GI at the centre of the debate and try to hold the publicity level for three years or more 2. Change Israeli public opinion 3. "Et surtout sur la politique menée par l'actuel gouvernement israélien"
29.03.2004	<p>Added that keeping the GI at the centre of the debate also includes corresponding media coverage and being present in all constituencies.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Generate favourable opinions among key personalities 5. Show the existence of a partner and the benefits from an accord
22.09.2006	<p>To specify the objective to generate favourable opinions among key personalities (point 4 above) in more detail, the aim is redefined as the reinforcement of the belief in negotiations as credible option to policy shapers.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Show danger of unilateral action and how to reduce damages by unilateral moves

	7. Continuation of the educational efforts (first mentioning of it as an explicit objective, done before as well)
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In late 2007 the new opportunities arising from the Annapolis process led to the objective of demonstrating how the GI and lessons learned from the negotiations leading to the GA can be used as a tool to draft a new agreement. From 2007 onwards the FDFA changed its funding principle from unearmarked money to earmarked money which resulted in the Kreditanträge being more focused on specific programmes and less on the overall objectives. Until 2007 however, it is worth noting that almost all FDFA objectives were embedded in Heskem's objectives including the shift in emphasis adding opinion leader and policy shapers in 2004. The notable exception is the international dissemination of the GI which was never formally deemed to be a primary goal of Heskem (based on the Kreditanträge).

Gadi Baltiansky, the managing director of Heskem, describes the initial objectives in retrospect to be two folded. First, they focused on name recognition emphasising terms like "final-status agreement", "end of conflict", "negotiations", "bilateralism" in order to become a reference point in the public, political and media discourse. Mr Baltiansky also mentioned that the national name recognition approach also targeted the international discourse which is probably overstating the impact possible of a national campaign. Secondly, Heskem focused on promoting the idea that there is a Palestinian partner and hence an agreement was possible. In early 2005 Heskem shifted the emphasis in reaction to Premier Minister Ariel Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan for Gaza. They focused more on the danger of unilateral action. The strategy changed again when the Olmert government entered the Annapolis process which enabled Heskem to reiterate the content of the GA. As the peace process restarted they also focussed more on decision makers (in the Knesset as well as in the government) trying to influence peace talks and to establish the GI as a mainstream idea. Since early 2009, Mr Baltiansky wants (i) to concretise the meaning of the GA by marketing the content of the annexes and (ii) to keep working with sceptical stakeholders using the basic principles of the GA.

2.3 PPC Objectives

The Palestinian NGO's objectives are all based on the various Kreditanträge from November 11th 2003 until March 25th 2008. The objectives and their development are depicted in table 2.

Table 2: Main PPC objectives in chronological order of occurrence

14.11.2003	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure that the GA reaches all segments of the Palestinian society (officials, people on the countryside,...) to broaden the peace coalition 2. Generate a favourable public opinion towards the GI 3. Convince the international community to use the GA as a basis for future negotiations 4. Finalising the annexes
06.04.2005	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Promote local public awareness and rational political debates 6. Change the political atmosphere (towards more peace friendly status)
09.03.2006	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. <u>Either</u> to push for more commitment to bilateral negotiations and not unilateral actions <u>Or</u> if Kadima/Abbas talks begin, to promote the GA as the only type of solution
22.09.2006	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Broad public: end-game solution through negotiations (danger of unilateral moves) 9. Dialogue with public policy shapers

From 2007 onwards "new project proposal [..., were] generally similar in terms of orientation as it was in 2006"³ while at the same time the new managing director Nidal Fuqaha openly abandoned the strategy of broad public campaigns. Furthermore, analogous to the Israeli partners, the introduction of earmarking money affected the way the Kreditanträge were justified, i.e. focussing more on the rational of the specific supported programme and less on the overall objectives.

³ Source: Kreditantrag, approved June 1st 2007

In comparison to the Israeli partner, the emphasis has always included a strong emphasis on international advocacy and focussed on the annexes relatively early on. Despite being very similar in strategy to Heskem, the PPC objectives tend to have a more prudent approach in their public outreach programmes, i.e. more emphasis is placed on informing the respective constituency and not trying to generate a discussion with the GI as the central theme.

2.4 GIC Objectives

Primary objective of the GIC as seen by the FDFA⁴ was to ensure good practise especially with respect to financial aspects of the GI. In particular the assignment consisted of

- Gaining further financial support by private donors
- Allocating and oversee the money allocation to the two partners
- Evaluating and overhauling their plans and strategies
- Ensuring proper audit

The memorandum of understanding between the parties and the GIC however states the objective slightly different in the sense that the financial control function is less stressed. "The GIC will:

- a) "Assist the ORP [Official Representative of the Party] in raising and obtaining funds for the promotion of the Geneva Initiative;
- b) Work closely with a Representative from the ORP, to be appointed by the ORP in consultation with the GIC, to discuss strategies and forward planning, to review implementation and to keep informed of the needs, activities and projects of the ORP;
- c) Meet and liaise regularly with the ORP Representative."

⁴ Source: Kreditantrag, approved April 4th 2004

2.5 Conclusion

The overall finding is that there was no apparent disconnect between the FDFA goals and the objectives of the two partner organisations or GIC. The changes in strategy in both partner organisations were well justified and in general in sync with the changes in the FDFA goals. The documentation of adjustments on the Palestinian side is slightly less stringent what can be partially due to the fact that the managing director changed after three years. The guidelines by the FDFA for the two GI partner organisations have always been loose which on one hand allowed the NGOs to adjust their strategies in a flexible manner and on the other hand made it hard to measure the adequate use of funds. However, a similar flexibility could exist if the objectives were phrased in a measurable manner. For instance, keeping the GI at the centre of the debate could be the goal and achieving 500 newspaper articles in the Israeli press in 2004 and in the subsequent two years 300 articles could be the objective.

The Geneva Initiative Committee was created with a clearly defined set of tasks despite the difference in emphasis with respect to the financial control function. This is an important finding as the scope of the GIC – and with it the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) – was controversial (see sections 4.1 and 5.3).


As a final note with respect to the FDFA objectives, we encourage the FDFA to internally reassess the importance of the GI as a tool to gain access to key decision makers in the Mid-Eastern Region because this point was questioned by some of the interview partners. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to check the validity of this criticism.

3 Input

3.1 Financial Support

The complicated payout structure (payments via HDC), different currencies, difference between budget and real cost, difference between the date of credit approval, transfer to HDC and payout to partner organisations make it virtually impossible to fully compare the various financial statements. The validity of the different amounts in the respective accounting books is checked by the respective auditor. Based on the Kreditanträge, the Swiss financial support is displayed in figure 1. The figure differentiates the date of the credit approval from the date of payout to give a more accurate picture in which year the money was actually available to the partner NGOs. It also shows the levelling out effect of these corrections and illustrates the sharp decline in Swiss financial involvement after 2006 when funding was almost cut in half.


Figure 1: Swiss Financial Support for GI activities (Source: all Kreditanträge)



The allocation of Switzerland's financial contribution has two substantial changes, namely (i) the increased and later stopped spending for GIC services and (ii) the shift towards earmarking money. Firstly, the expenses for the HDC and the external auditing firm (PWC) which carried out most of the GIC obligations (see section 4.1) were already high in the beginning and increase sharply in 2005, reaching a quarter of the money allocated to the three actors. This was a central reason for the dissolution of the GIC in August 2006. Secondly, Switzerland changed its support approach in mid 2006 from then on money was spent project-based (though keeping a substantial amount of money for core-funding) instead of un-


earmarked as before. With this change, Switzerland also began to financially support the Israeli NGO more (relative to PPC). The money is now split about 7 to 3 in Heskem's favour. This marks a paradigm shift from equal support in real terms for both NGOs to a balance based on purchasing power.

Figure 2: Swiss Financial Support for GI activities (Source: all Kreditanträge)



Both partner organisations depend heavily on Swiss funding as acknowledged by both managing directors. This is not primarily the case because the share of Switzerland's donation compared to the overall funding (around 40% of Heskem funds are of FDFA origin in every year, PPC's more varying dependence is depicted in figure 3). The main reason is that the overwhelming part of the core-funding is provided by Switzerland because other donors are not willing to support the general existence of the two NGOs (i.e. only specific activities).

Figure 3: Swiss financial support for PPC (in CHF) and the Swiss share of the overall additional funding in the same year (Source: PPC internal accounting)



3.2 Goodwill Support

Alongside the financial support, the GI has been relying on a broad goodwill support in form of attending the December 1st 2003 ceremony or other forms of endorsement. A long list of former presidents, prime ministers, foreign and defence ministers, heads of international agencies, and others expressing their support for the GI is impressive evidence of that. Also part of this list is then member of congress Rahm Emanuel who lately became President Obama's chief of staff.

3.3 Geneva Initiative Network (GIN)

Another source of support had been organised in the form of the Geneva Initiative Network (GIN). Meetings were held in Brussels on a bi-annual basis and were aimed at providing an opportunity for participating governments and organisations to

1. "receive first-hand information on the development of the public campaign initiated by the Israeli and Palestinian partners;

2. express their own ideas and proposals concerning potential contributions to the Geneva Initiative process and;
3. receive adequate information on the financial structure [...] to finance the public campaign on an individual project basis."

It seems⁵ that GIN included 15 countries at the first meeting. The participating countries in the subsequent three GIN gatherings⁶ are listed in table 3. It remains unclear why the network was terminated as the number of participants provides no reason to do so. An indication is the limited fundraising success. The most convincing argument given by the people interviewed was that the political gain was realised (e.g. good reason to network and maintain contacts) and further meetings were expected to bring no substantial added value.

⁵ There were not enough information available in the documents to be sure to have obtained the comprehensive picture of the GIN activities. Interviews though suggest that the overall picture is correctly displayed in this evaluation.

⁶ Sources are two documents provided by the HDC: "Compte-rendu du Geneva Initiative Network meeting du 8.09.04 à Bruxelles" and "Participants at the GIN meeting on Mai (sic!) 18th 2005 at the Swiss Mission in Brussels"

Table 3: List of GIN participants from March 2004 until May 2005

11.03.2004	08.09.2004	18.05.2005
<i>Arab Countries [8]</i> Algeria Egypt Jordan Morocco Oman Qatar Tunisia United Arab Emirates	<i>Arab Countries [6]</i> Algeria Jordan Morocco Oman Qatar Tunisia	<i>Arab Countries [4]</i> Algeria Jordan Morocco Oman
<i>European Countries [11]</i> Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Slovenia Spain Sweden	<i>European Countries [19]</i> Austria Belgium Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Hungary Island Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden	<i>European Countries [20]</i> Austria Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Norway Poland Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden
<i>Other Countries [3]</i> Canada Russia South Africa	<i>Other Countries [7]</i> Canada China Japan Mexico Russia Turkey South Africa	<i>Other Countries [6]</i> Canada China Japan Mexico Russia Turkey

3.4 Conclusion

Switzerland supported the two organisations significantly, both financially and non-financially. The financial contributions were cut in half after 2006 and remained roughly the same since, whereas the non-financial support also declined but started to increase again during 2008.

Both organisations were able to acquire additional financial resources although with varying success over the years (especially the PPC). The narrowing of support in the numbers of donors as well as the decline in sum of all is not surprising since "product" GI remained the same and the changing political environment also did not provide any ultimate obvious reason for an engagement by a donor. Very positively noted is the resumption of the Swedish support by the Olof Palme Centre for PPC in 2008. This is a remarkable in light of the very critical evaluation of both NGOs but of the PPC in particular.

The dependence on Swiss funding of usually between 40% and 60% of the annual budget is an acceptable situation. However, it is clear – and not disputed by either managing director – that both organisations are not self-sustaining as Switzerland is providing the overwhelming majority of the core funding to both.

The funding of the GIC was not only unsustainable – which was also probably never a goal – but was also almost completely reliant on Swiss core funding. The FDFA reached the same conclusion ten months after founding the GIC: "Die internationalen Doners sind nicht bereit, ein Overhead an das HDC zu zahlen, obwohl das üblich ist."

There is limited information available to find out whether the GIN directly or indirectly affected the funding by other countries. Based on the development of the attendees of the GIN meetings it seemed to have worked well to disseminate the GI message and therefore probably helped to make the GI a reference point in the international diplomatic circles.

4.1 GIC Structure

The original organisational structure ("*GIC structure*") to support activities of the GI was based on a division between political supervision by the donor (e.g. decision by FDFA which projects to fund) and the administrative supervision by the Geneva Initiative Committee (GIC). The latter supervision was again divided into a strategic supervision (GIC) and an operational supervision (HDC) of the two partner organisations (Heskem, PPC).

The following three figures depict the relationship between the different actors. Funds were transferred from the donor to the GIC which then allocated money to the partner organisations (figure 5). The accounting of the two NGOs has been conducted by their respective certified public accountants (CPA). Extraordinary is that the monthly internal audit is carried out by an external public accountancy firm (PWC Tel Aviv, PWC Ramallah). In fact, it is only semi-internal as the HDC is also briefed (via PWC Zurich). The external audit (Figure 7) is carried out by Ernst & Young which reports to the respective NGO (Heskem, PPC) as well as to the HDC which then passes it on to the GIC and hence also the FDFA. This heavy accounting structure was especially needed because the PPC had many accounting irregularities in its first four years of existence.

Figure 5: The original organisational structure (2004-2006) – Transfer of Funds




Figure 6: The original organisational structure (2004-2006) – Internal Reporting





Figure 7: The original organisational structure (2004-2006) – External Audit



4.1.1 Geneva Initiative Committee (GIC)

The reason for the creation of the Geneva Initiative Committee (GIC) can be partially derived from the objectives given to the GIC (see section 2.4) which can be linked to FDFA's objective to (i) outsource the administrative and financial supervision and (ii) hope that external donors would be more willing to contribute if approached by an external, internationally trusted, and politically neutral institution. The FDFA concentrated on the political supervision and in general kept a political distance between itself and the operational actors of the GI.

The GIC comprised five members of which both the FDFA and the HDC appointed two persons⁷ each, while the chairman was a joint appointee (see table 4). The GIC was eventually dissolved at the end of August 2006 for reasons which are discussed in the next section.

Table 4: Original GIC Members in 2004

FDFA Appointees	HDC Appointees
Dr. Peter Buomberger (Chairman)	
Amb. Urs Ziswiler	HDC Dir. Martin Griffiths
Prof. Dr. Alexis Keller	Peter Küng

⁷ Peter Küng was appointed by the HDC but suggested by the FDFA.

4.1.2 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)

The administrative side of the GIC duties was carried out by the HDC employee Brooke Spellmann who left HDC in December 2004 and was replaced by Céline Yvon in February 2005. Director Martin Griffiths provided the official link between the GIC and the HDC. The HDC/GIC involvement in the GI terminated after less than three years for a series of reasons. First, the HDC did not feel comfortable with the role it was assigned. A certain sense of discomfort existed from the start but became pressing after some months. In the autumn 2004 HDC director Martin Griffiths questioned whether HDC should be part of the GIC structure in the year 2005 as it is "not consistent with the pattern of other work at the organisation"⁸ but was persuaded by the other GIC members to continue by praising the HDC "for taking on an unorthodox role within the project". Closely linked with the unorthodox role of the HDC is the second reason. The GIC/HDC structure was very costly which led to criticism by the two NGOs as well as concerns in the FDFA. Third, the original GI private facilitator, Alexis Keller, wanted to quit the GIC when he got an offer from Harvard University. His desire (and the subsequent desire of other members to quit) together with the internal questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the GIC triggered a debate about the future role of the organisation. Following the dissolution, the HDC financial control tasks were reduced by switching from unearmarked to earmarked money and with respect to PPC, some financial oversight tasks were superseded by the SDC bureau Gaza/West Bank headquartered in Jerusalem.

4.2 H.L. Education for Peace Ltd. (Geneva Initiative) - Heskem


4.2.1 Organisation

Heskem was founded to promote the GI on the Israeli side. The organisational structure of Heskem is lean and project-oriented, i.e. there are no unnecessary intermediate staff positions as depicted in figure 8. Furthermore, there is a special liaison officer (Elad Dunayevsky) to coordinate activities with PPC. The professional board of directors supervises technical and legal aspects of the organisations work while the steering committee is the political body.

⁸ GIC Minutes 17 September 2004

Two main personnel changes occurred since the founding of Heskem. First, Daniel Levy, who is considered the main drafter of the GA on the Israeli side, used to work as the foreign relations coordinator until he left the organisation 2006 to join the New America Foundation. Second, Yossi Beilin became chairman of the steering committee after he left politics late 2008.

Figure 8: Organisational chart of Heskem



4.2.2 Selection of Target Groups

Heskem changed its strategy over time as depicted in the table below. After the initial promotional campaign and before the Annapolis process started in late 2007, Heskem focussed less on large-scale public outreach for approximately two and a half years. Heskem also reassessed its choice of target groups and concluded to drop cooperation with social and geographically peripheral groups, labour unions, former military experts, and the Israeli-Arab community. The entire Israeli population and the media were always part of the target groups but not explicitly mentioned in the Kreditanträge (see table 5).

Table 5: Heskem's Selection of Target Groups – Source: Kreditanträge from 14.11.2003, 20.03.2004, 06.04.2005, and 22.09.2006

	14.11.03	29.03.04	06.04.05	22.09.06
Entire Israeli Population	X			X
Media	X			
Youth	X	X	X	X
Political Leaders / Decision Makers	X	X	X	X
United States of America		X	X	X
Social and Geographic Periphery		X	X	
Labour Unions			X	
Former Military Experts			X	
Israeli-Arab Community		X	X	
Russian Community		X	X	

4.3 Palestinian Peace Coalition / Geneva Initiative (PPC/GI)

4.3.1 Organisation

PPC was founded to promote the GI on the Palestinian side. The original organisational chart (figure 9) exhibits a lot of different committees, staff positions (General Secretary, PPC-Coordinator) and an unclear distribution of power; in short, the organisation was overly extensive. The organisational structure of PPC changed dramatically after Nidal Fuqaha became executive director⁹ in 2007. In comparison, the new organisational structure is much leaner and allocates the responsibilities in a more direct fashion (see figure 10).

⁹ PPC tends to use executive director instead of managing director. The latter term seems more appropriate for the position described and is therefore used in the report (except for the organisational charts)

Figure 9: Initial organisational chart of PPC – Source: PPC, 2003-2006





Figure 10: Current organisational chart of PPC – Source: PPC, 2007 – now



4.3.2 Selection of Target Groups

Table 6 depicts the selected target groups based on the Kreditanträge. As these reflect the FDFA's perception of the selected target groups, it means that the actual target groups might have been broader. The PPC changed the target groups over time and shifted more towards domestic opinion leaders. In 2008 the PPC reduced the number of target groups to three, namely¹⁰:

- Broad Palestinian public
- Policy shapers and broad opinion leaders
- Advocacy outreach with international constituencies (including Palestinian, Arab and Jewish pressure groups and activists, Arab and Jewish leaders abroad and key policy and legislative figures, with a focus on the United States of America and Europe)

Table 6: PPC's Selection of Target Groups – Source: Kreditanträge from 14.11.2003, 20.03.2004, 06.04.2005, and 22.09.2006

	14.11.03	29.03.04	06.04.05	22.09.06
Civil Society	X	X	X	X
Palestinian Diaspora	X	X		
Israeli Public	X	X		
International Officials	X	X		
United States of America	X	X		
Local Ministries & Decision Makers			X	X
Political Parties			X	
Refugees in the WB and Gaza			X	
Women				X
Youth				X

¹⁰ Source: PPC's Annual Report of the year 2008

4.4 Conclusion

The teams in both NGOs are very dedicated. Both organisations furthermore faced similar difficulties to benefit from their respective leaders (Yossi Beilin, Yasser Abed Rabbo respectively) and on one hand while distancing themselves from them on the other hand in order to become a broad civil society movement. Heskem struggled as long as Yossi Beilin pursued his own political ambitions which generated negative publicity and branded Heskem/GI to be a "leftish idea". After Mr Beilin left politics he became chairman of the steering committee and still participates in Heskem activities if asked. The combination of being a speaker if needed and being officially involved only in a presentable position should help the organisation to be better able to position itself in the political mainstream.

Analogue to the Heskem – Yossi Beilin relationship, the PPC – Yasser Abed Rabbo relationship has its up- and downsides. Difficulties stem from the fact that PPC is tied to one charismatic but also controversial public figure. Mr Rabbo ensures the almost track 1 status of the GI in his position as the secretary general of the PLO and therefore helps the GI to remain politically relevant in the OPT. Organisational, he is only a member of the steering committee but his strong personality makes it difficult for other key Palestinian personalities to participate in the GI/PPC activities. In the past two important steps were taken on behalf of the PPC to make the relationship with Mr Rabbo more transparent. First, PPC geographically separated its office from the former joint premises with the Palestinian Media Center (PMC), which is run by Yasser Abed Rabbo. Second, he is now receiving a monthly salary of slightly less than the salary of the managing directors' one although members of the steering committee are normally not allowed to receive any compensation. This salary made the relationship between Mr. Rabbo and PPC more transparent and probably positively contributed to PPC's enhanced compliance with international accounting standards. The purpose of the salary according to the PPC is to compensate Mr Rabbo for his increased security needs – such a clarification, however, is missing in the financial statement. Generally, the payment to Mr Rabbo is substantial and subject to the FDFA's assessment whether it is politically sensible to continue the payments or whether this amount should (partially) be spent on other GI activities. If the former is the case then the salary should be treated as a top off (additional to PA security payments) and not exceed the *additional* security need.

Very positively noted is that the PPC's organisational structure, which previously had been somewhat complicated, has changed to a much leaner structure. In addi-

tion, the employment contracts are now only on a yearly basis. This ensures a more flexible adjustment to changes in funding. On the downside, the dispute with former managing director Elias Zananiri¹¹ about the severance payment is still outstanding (although the appropriate provisions have been made according to the auditor Deloitte & Touche).

Selected Target Groups

The selection of the NGOs respective target groups is in line with the broad objectives laid out by each organisation and by the FDFFA. When it comes to the effectiveness of their choices, Heskem added three suboptimal targets: labour unions, the Israeli-Arab community¹², and the former military experts. The first two are both (for different reasons) generally favourable towards peace initiatives like the GI and hence are unlikely to achieve a substantial impact on mainstream Israeli decision makers. Approaching them at large scale would be ineffective. The third target group – former military experts – is also somewhat questionable as the GI had notable support from this group already and military experts can still be approached as part of other target groups. Heskem acknowledged the ineffectiveness of their choices and abandoned them in 2006. The PPC also selected target groups, which are debateable choices if it comes to the effectiveness thereof: civil society / broad Palestinian public, Palestinian diaspora and refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, and Jewish pressure groups. All of them are undoubtedly important groups to be reached. However, civil society is not an effective target group as the PPC itself declares that Palestinians are not open to the brand name of the GI and other interviewees argue that the general public – especially the refugees – are not open to discuss any other unofficial peace treaty that is also perceived to be an academic exercise. With respect to the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees within the territories, it has been highly questionable to approach them as long as the solution for the refugee is still vague (though more precise than any other equivalent peace agreement) and not openly discussable in Palestine. In order to proof the effectiveness of approaching them would require more reasoning on behalf of the PPC.

¹¹ The replacement of Mr Zananiri was positively noted by external sources who claimed that the successor has less of an own agenda, e.g. cares less whether he can go on an international event or not.

¹² From August 2005 onwards the Israeli-Arabs were even sometimes even excluded from the polls commissioned by Heskem, as around 80% of them support the GI. Source: Polling information to the August 2005 Polls conducted by Marketwatch. The reasoning for targeting Israeli-Arabs was to coordinate their support.

The selection of Jewish pressure groups as a target group is probably too ambitious and should primarily be done via Heskem.

GIC Structure

The GIC structure was an understandable choice as it allowed the FDFA to organisationally distance itself from the day-to-day business. In addition, it ensured the proper use of funds (as much as this was possible at the beginning). However, the structure was inefficient due to the heavy reliance on costly external audit firms. The financial control function turned out to be the biggest concern on behalf of the FDFA and hence another organisation with strength in this respect would have been the better choice (as even pointed out by HDC itself). Nonetheless, HDC was also a good choice because of their long and good track record of cooperation with the PA IV but also in light of their inexperience in the region (with its obvious downsides) which gave them a neutral image needed in a highly politicised region. The current drastically reduced structure without PWC and GIC/HDC but with the SDC in charge of limited financial control functions for PPC appears appropriate taking into account the current situation of the PPC. However, the current structure would probably not have been the right choice from the start since HDC ensured political distance for the Swiss government in case of a failure or a major crisis.

5 Output / Activities

The two partner NGOs launched a series of activities that are depicted in table 7 according to the intensity by which they are pursuing them and according to the time lag required to measure any impact.

Table 7: Current Activities categorised according to the effort applied by the two NGO's and according to the time lag until the activities have an impact.

Activity	Time Lag until Impact	Heskem	PPC
Polling	Short-term	X	X
Public Outreach / Media Campaign	Short-term	X	
Policy & Position Papers	Short-term	XX	X
Outreach to Decision Makers	Mid-term	XXX	XX
International Advocacy	Mid-term		
- Arab World ¹³		X	X
- US Administration / Congress		XXX	XX
- US Jewish Community			
- Western Europe		XX	XX
- Rest of the World		X	X
Education Programmes	Mid- / Long-term		
- Youth		XX	XXX
- Women		X	X
- Refugees			X
- Inner-Palestinian Peace			XX
Outreach to Other Target Group			
- Shas Ultra-Orthodox Community	Mid-term	XX	
- Russian Community	Long-term	XX	

Legend: X – sometimes, XX – often, XXX – very often

¹³ Both NGO's mainly approached the Kingdom of Jordan and less so Egypt. Due to Israel's very limited diplomatic relationship with the Arab World, it is clear that Heskem's activities in the Arab world are limited.

The work on the annexes is not mentioned above as it is an integral part of the GA but just finished later. In the next two sections all activities – with the exception of polling which will be addressed in section 6.5 – are briefly described.

5.1 Heskem

The first major Heskem activity was to deliver the GA to every Israeli household by mail (1.9 million copies) and following up with media events. Thereafter various activities were started and have been either institutionalised or stopped. Most of the activities involve the participation of Palestinians. The categorisation of the activities leads to double and triple counting, e.g. a weekend seminar with Russian-speaking community leaders is listed as a weekend seminar, as an activity for the Russian-speaking community, and as an event designed for local opinion leaders and decision makers.

5.1.1 Op-Eds, Policy and Position Papers

Policy papers aim to present the GI's viewpoint on developments in the region in a extensive way. Position papers are shorter and more directly linked to daily politics. Even shorter are Op-eds which are opinions expressed in newspapers on the opposite page of the editorial. Heskem has been issuing at least one position or policy paper per month to keep the GI alive in the public discourse.


5.1.2 Outreach to Decision Makers and Opinion Leaders

Conferences, Seminars & Gatherings

Conferences on various topics have been organised. Until 2005 gatherings and conferences were not separately counted. In reaction to the Annapolis conference in December 2007, Heskem held eleven conferences (the same amount as the previous two years combined) and had more than 50% more participants (300 on average). The number of two-day seminars developed along similar ideas including a strong increase from 2005 to 2006 (figure 11). Participants are recruited inter alia from assistants to members of Knesset members and their assistants and min-

isters, public figures from local authorities, activists from various parties across the political spectrum, and journalists.


Figure 11: Number of seminars and average participants from 2004 to 2008



Outreach to Local Leadership

Heskem organised so-called "Day in a Town" events to reach out to local leaders of a variety of cities throughout Israel. The concept consisted of a set of events lasting one day including public town-hall style gatherings which always includes a senior Palestinian representative as well. After the first two years, the concept was adjusted in order to focus more on the local leadership and less on the general local public yielding a more assembly like event (figure 12). Accordingly, the numbers of attendees declined by a factor 9. In addition, the number of "Day in a Town" event was also reduced from 13 and 14 respectively in the first two years to 9 in 2006 and 10 in 2007 and 2008. The reason for this adjustment is that the objective shifted from general public events to influencing policy makers and public opinion leaders.


Figure 12: Number of "Day in a Town" and average participants (2004-2008)



Tours Around the Separation Wall

Retired Col. Shaul Arieli often guides the Heskem tours around the separation barrier near Jerusalem and the northern West Bank region. One of the drafters of the maps of the GA illustrates the current situation, shows the existing challenges around the Jerusalem area, and explains the proposal of the GI visually to around 50 people each tour. The number of tours conducted tripled from 2004 to 2005 and steadily declined thereafter due to budget constraints (figure 13). According to Mr Baltiansky, the demand for such tours by the diplomatic community, political party officials, and others now clearly exceed the numbers of tours offered.

Figure 13: Number of tours around the separation wall from 2004 to 2008



5.1.3 Outreach to Specific Target Groups¹⁴

Outreach to Arab Israelis

Heskem approached the Israeli-Arab community and offered seminars, lectures, workshops, tours along the separation wall, and the "Day in a Town" in order to engage them in an active dialogue and coordinate their support. The programme was stopped due to perceived little added value (already 80% supported the GI at the beginning and their influence on the government is negligible) and scarce financial resources.

Outreach to Russian-speaking Community

The Russian-speaking community in Israel is generally seen as a very sceptical constituency¹⁵ and was initially approached with a variety of activities ranging from PR, to guided tours to the WB and seminars with community leaders. In addition to these activities, Heskem also operates a Russian webpage and focuses its activities on opinion leaders (Russian-speaking politicians, journalists, and heads of immigration organisations).

Outreach to the Shas Ultra-Orthodox Constituency

Representatives of this ultra-orthodox group have always been part of an Israeli government. Recently, Heskem also organised events for the Shas movement. Starting with events for rabbis, members of Knesset and their assistants, advisors to ministers, local politicians, and journalists, Heskem is now also offering events for Shas women.

5.1.4 Public Outreach

Towards the end of the year 2004, the effects of public outreach activities were limited due to attention given to Sharon's disengagement policy. Heskem organised two rallies with 160'000 participants, a car convoy with 300 participants as well as an internet one-day campaign. In late 2004 and during 2005, Heskem

¹⁴ None of the specific target group activities were directly funded by Swiss money.

¹⁵ Only about 30% of the Russian-speaking community expressed some kind of support for the GI

launched the "partner campaign" in which Israeli and Palestinian public figures address each other's publics in shorts films explaining that there is a partner for permanent status agreement. It was a costly campaign as it was broadcasted to the public through local movie theatres and television stations. Less expensive was the dissemination via the Internet, newspapers, and radio. In the following years, the public campaigns have been mostly running through internet and newspaper advertisements as well as billboards.

5.1.5 Educational Work

Lectures

The Heskem lectures addressed various aspects of the GI's message and have been delivered inter alia to academics, politicians from left to right, and security experts from Israel and Palestine.

High School Programme

It is not possible for Heskem to organise activities at high schools as a law prohibits any political NGO to get engaged in schools. Therefore, Heskem cooperated with an organisation called ESHED, which provides 11th to 12th graders in Israeli high schools with information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These activities peaked in 2005 and 2006 where over 7'000 pupils were reached per year. The number dropped dramatically inter alia due to a strike but also due to the fact that less resources were allocated to this project. The project discontinued in 2009.

Students

Heskem is organising campus speaker events and joint overseas seminars. In reaction to a GI event, students were starting a joint student newspaper called triangle. Heskem supported this idea from 2005 to 2007, which produced an issue in each of the six semesters with on average of 8'000 copies distributed copies. In 2006 four additional issues were produced during the summer period with a total of 9'000 copies. This activity was stopped in 2008 due to financial constraints.

5.1.6 International Advocacy

GI Israeli and Palestinian representatives have met with heads of states, foreign ministers, decision makers, and international journalist. The meetings took place both in Israel and abroad where the ones in foreign countries were mainly invitations to seminars, forums, and conferences.

5.2 PPC

The documentation of PPC's activities prior to Mr Fuqaha taking office is rather poor. The list of activities for 2005, for instance, claims that a youth conference with 800 participants was organised while an average youth assembly yielded around 40 participants. Sometimes, events are singled out that should be combined (e.g. peace activists meeting on February 14th 2006 and the subsequent interview with BBC on the same day was listed as separate activities). The evaluation therefore focuses more on the activities conducted subsequent to Mr Fuquaha's taking office. The new managing director also introduced a formal way of self-evaluation of their own activities. The "activity evaluation form" for instance asks participants four questions:

- Was the title of the activity appropriate, and why?
- Was the interaction good, and why?
- What are the subjects that you think should be disused in future activities?
- What are your suggestions to improve our future activities?

The internal evaluation of activities focused mostly on the improvement of the procedural question, e.g. how to overcome language barriers or how to create a secure environment for participants in order to start the work on issues in seminars faster, and put less emphasis on which topics should be discussed more extensively.

Switzerland directly funds four PPC activities: polling (see next section), policy papers and op-eds, political and youth seminars, and international advocacy.

5.2.1 Op-Eds, Policy and Position Papers

Op-Eds, Policy and position papers are done similarly to how Heskem creates and distributing them (see above). The position papers, however, are also produced in an even shorter version and printed out as part of the PPC newsletter that is attached to the al-Ayyam newspaper – the second-largest circulated daily newspaper in the OPT – on a monthly basis. In addition, PPC produces a bi-monthly newspaper attachment called Attareek to reach people who would not read position or even policy papers.

5.2.2 Outreach to Decision Makers and Opinion Leaders

PPC has organised seminars for local leaders on topics covering e.g. the role of the media in the peace process or the Palestinian role in the Annapolis process and the negotiators' view of Jerusalem. On average 70 to 80 people attended these seminars and the speakers came from different parties (PPP, PLFP, Fatah and even Hamas in Gaza) and from the media. Around half of the events are held on the Gaza strip although the PPC has only one employee who works there but without the support of a local office.¹⁶ The original PPC office was looted in summer of 2007 by Hamas militants.

The other main outreach activities are town assemblies with participation of local politicians and residents. In 2007 twelve towns (seven in 2008) were part of the programme and on average 100 people participated¹⁷.

5.2.3 Public Outreach

After the launch of the GI on December 1st 2003, all three major newspapers in Palestine printed the essence of the GA. PPC purchased 10'000m² of billboards with slogans like "discrimination or equality?" "Peace or destruction?" "Corruption or reforms?" "Occupation or independence?" "Fighting or dialogue?". Complementary to their Israeli partner, PPC also bought media to air the "partner cam-

¹⁶ On August 9th 2007 the PPC resumed their seminar activities in Gaza after the violent eruption following the Hamas victory.

¹⁷ This average excludes the extreme value of 500 counted in Ramallah in 2007 as well as the 1'300 people counted in Jenin a year later.

paign" on Al-Arabia (in order to also reach the people leaving outside the territories) and Palestinian local TV stations.

Then in 2005 a freedom and independence rally with 12'000 participants including Abu Mazen was held parallel to a Heskem rally in West Jerusalem. In the course of the first two years, 35 smaller rallies were organised against Israel's unilateral steps (mainly against the separation wall).

Other public outreach activities included political talk shows aired on radio and one-time events. An example of an one-time event is a photo exhibition of the separation wall "to explain the detrimental effect the wall is having on a negotiated two-state agreement." (PPC's annual report, 2007).

5.2.4 Educational Work

Summer Youth Camps

A major PPC activity are the summer youth camps which have been attended by around 6'000 in 2004 as compared to only 870 participants in 2006. The four main themes were "sharing, discipline, sport and fun".

Peace Snowball

PPC's goal here is to train the trainers and so to create a snowball effect of people spreading the ideal's of the GI. The theme of the training sessions rarely¹⁸ focuses explicitly on the GI but is usually very closely linked (e.g. "partnership and coexistence", "structuring peace groups").

Workshops

Workshops organised by the PPC aim at university students and civil society organisations. The topics have been usually centred around "youth for peace", democracy, co-existence, and how to get other people involved in the peace movement.

¹⁸ In 2006 for instance, only one out of fifteen sessions was on the GI explicitly naming it. Source: PPC's annual report 2007.

5.2.5 International Advocacy

PPC participated in various seminars, conferences, and forums abroad. Most attention is given to the Western world based on PPC's assessment that pressure on the Israeli government can only come from the USA and the EU.

5.3 GIC

The GIC carried out all four objectives given to this institution in the beginning, however, with varying degree of fulfilment. Firstly, the HDC tried to ensure the proper use of funds by introducing a vigorous financial reporting mechanism. This achievement is confirmed by both NGOs although they criticised the inefficiency of the system, similar views were held by the FDFA which went even further by stating that the HDC employee in charge of GI administration was dedicated but not enough experienced. Secondly, the regular meetings with both managing directors did take place every three months. Thirdly, the committee members actively tried to acquire additional donors (usually foundations). However, after the first problems with the proper use of funds on the PPC side emerged, the motivation to use one's own relationship to convince further donors to make financial contributions declined among GIC members. Fourthly, even though the programmatic aid of evaluating and overhauling the partner organisation's plans and strategies was offered to the two NGOs, the GIC did not deliver its aid because it was not welcomed by both partner organisations. This part of the planned activities was never accepted in practise and was – after a period of irritation and disputes – finally not enforced¹⁹.

5.4 Conclusion

The advocacy services provided by both NGOs in the form of policy and position papers have been very good. Also the initial criticism raised at the GIC meeting of March 9th 2004 that "... the parties have limited programming capacity, and that

¹⁹ Tellingly, Mr Baltiansky in retrospect named only two GIC task (easier for other donors to transfer funds and to recruit new donors) and neglected the programmatic aspects of the memorandum of understanding between GIC and Heskem.

their campaigning is fairly ad hoc and uncoordinated work both sides" is certainly not valid anymore. The outline of all activities is drafted at the beginning of the week and liaison officers on both sides coordinate joint activities.

The most important underlying reason for differences in activities between the two NGOs is due to strategic considerations stemming from the almost track 1 nature of the GI in Palestine and track 2 in Israel. This leads to a more inclusive and broader approach by Heskem's while PPC remains fairly general and advocacy work with the general public remains limited. Recently, this inherent conflict re-emerged when Boaz Karni, co-founder of the Economic Cooperation Foundation and chairman of the board for Heskem, made a "friendly leak" of the security annexes to the most popular newspaper in Israel, Yedioth Ahronoth. While it is a good tactic for a track 2 oriented NGO – yielding free publicity –, it did not fit the dissemination strategy of PPC which is very, probably too, cautious due to the positions held by Palestinian key GI supporters or annexes drafters. The leak only appeared in the Israeli press but many influential persons in Palestine read Israeli newspapers and Palestinian newspaper reported on the leak as well, and hence the spill-over effects were strong. This led to irritations among the two NGOs and tensions with annexes drafters²⁰.

5.4.1 Heskem

The number of conferences, seminars, tours or "Day in a Town" events have been adjusted to reflect changing needs. Before and after the Annapolis conference, for instance, the number of conferences was increased to complement the external event. Heskem is also mindful of the need for cost benefit analysis. This is specifically apparent when they decide where to hold a seminar. Local events are much cheaper²¹ but less effective in regard to partaking of Palestinian participants due to restrictions of movement by the Israeli security forces. Hence participation by Palestinians is easier outside of Israel (e.g. Kingdom of Jordan or Turkey) but at the same time much more costly.

²⁰ Nonetheless, a joint event on the content of the refugee annexe was held on September 14th 2009 with the participation of Palestinian annexe drafter and former Ashraf Al-Ajrami

²¹ This is especially true for Shas activities due to their strict diet requirements.

We consider Heskem's preference for limited and focused public outreach programmes, i.e. only one peak event every year²² as a more efficient way than to run sporadic smaller campaigns. Also positive was the shift towards more targeted approaches of the Russian-speaking community (away from directly trying to influence the general public).

The education for peace activities have been dramatically reduced as both the high school project – after a previous gradual decline in scale – and student newspaper recently were stopped. Although it is sensible to stop an activity, if it is too costly, such a drastic reduction in educational projects should be reflected by indications of a shift of strategy.

Managing director Gadi Baltiansky proposed to dissolve Heskem in 2006 when Hamas took power and Israel pursued strong unilateralism. In light of this, it is questionable if a NGO like Heskem with an expected short or medium time span of existence is appropriate to run long-term activities. This even if the content of a long-term activity is valuable per se – such as the educational projects or the events for the Russian-speaking constituency.

The picture of the efficiency of the international outreach activities is mixed. On one hand, the good networking in the past years is now paying off for Heskem, as they are now able to directly inform the US administration about the content of the annexes²³. On the other hand, Heskem has very little significant influence on the Jewish community in the United States²⁴.

5.4.2 PPC

As a preamble to the critical assessment of the PPC activities, we acknowledge the political constraints that PPC faces such as restricted movement of persons due movement restrictions by the Israeli army. This at least partially explains the less efficient organisation of events such as town assemblies. It does not, however,

²² In 2006, for example, Heskem used the Lebanon war to reiterate the message raised during the Gaza disengagement that "we can win only by reaching an agreement".

²³ This claim by Heskem was confirmed by credible external sources.

²⁴ Mr Baltiansky acknowledged this failure and explains it with the difficulties finding an adequate representative there. The main Israeli GA drafter, Daniel Levy, is now living in the United States but is considered by Mr Baltiansky to be perceived by the American Jewish community as being too leftist. Without stronger impact on the US Jewish communities, Heskem's efforts to position the GI as mainstream organisation remains hampered.

explain why the organisation, according their own annual report of 2007, missed the targeted 4'000 participants in 2005 and attracted only 1'500 youths. In general, it is hard to measure the efficiency of PPC based on documents and interviews, especially as it is complicated by the fact that the new managing director changed a lot (see section 4.3) and is in office for less than two years.

Generally, the content of many activities have not been linked closely with the GI. It started off with many activities not mentioning the GI in the first two years as PPC deemed it to be counterproductive during the second Intifada. Moreover, the promoted content has been fairly general, e.g. the above mentioned billboard slogans and the four themes of the youth camps. In response to the Swedish evaluation claiming that the "Raise Your Voice" campaign was a pure election campaign for presidential candidate Mahmoud Abbas, Mr Zananiri practically confirmed this allegation²⁵. It is however important to note here that (i) some activities were stopped²⁶ and (ii) Switzerland does for the most part not directly²⁷ support these kind of activities anymore since the funding became earmarked. The youth seminars and workshop remain vague in their approach.

The tendency to organise more open seminars and to include also Hamas in these outreach events helps the overall aim of PPC, namely to broaden the coalition for peace. At the same time, seminars including Hamas focus on the issue of the lacking national unity amongst Palestinians. Although it is undisputed that Palestinian national unity is essential for any kind of peace treaty with Israel, it is out of PPC's scope. Mr Fuqaha acknowledges this shortcoming but refers to the special permission given to him by the FDFA to start these activities.

International advocacy work is mostly done indirectly, i.e. through participation of activities organised by others, rather than actively pushing issues and trying to persuade others to organise pro GI events. In addition, the main target of PPC's activities are focussed on Western countries and audiences which is insufficient given the fact that it would be easier for PPC (compared to Heskem) to approach

²⁵ "We consider President Mahmoud Abbas the highest senior Palestinian official who "speaks" the Geneva Initiative language. Right after his election, and at a press conference he held immediately after the results were published, Abu Mazen was asked by a visiting Greek journalist whether the Geneva Initiative parameters for solving the refugees question were accepted to him and his answer was as clear as the GI itself: We support a negotiated and agreed upon settlement for the question of refugees based on Resolution 194." Source: Comments by Elias Zananiri to the external evaluation on behalf of the Olof Palme Centre.

²⁶ Stopped activities are e.g. the business sector outreach or state building activities such as training for security officers in the field of the rule of law

²⁷ As Switzerland is still paying most of the overhead cost, an indirect funding still exists.

the Arab world and that the GI is making explicit reference to the Arab Peace Initiative.

PPC is showing significant steps towards monitoring and internally evaluating their own activities. It is evident that PPC has become more stringent and based on lessons learnt from past activities but so far little impact has been documented. Moreover, these lessons learnt are for the most part concerned with how to carry out the activities in a more productive way. While this is important, the content oriented lessons learnt, such as which topics need to be addressed, are poor. An example²⁸ of this are the evaluation questions presented in section 5.2.

5.4.3 GIC

The GIC did not live up to its promise. Even after the GIC was dissolved, there were still many accounting irregularities on the Palestinian side. The situation dramatically improved – with a certain time lag –after the new managing director took office. To GIC's credit we note that their tools to enforce the proper use of funds by PPC were limited. When the GIC once stopped a payment, they were overruled by the donor, i.e. the FDFA.

The fundraising activities had limited success. Only a few foundations actually supported the two partner NGOs. The conclusion of the FDFA after nine months of attempted fund raising, that "das HDC [...] Fundraising war erfolglos". This overall assessment was too negative as a final judgement. It is true however, that the expectations of the two NGO's and the FDFA were not met by the GIC/HDC.

²⁸ Another example are the three lessons learnt for the project "the strengthening of Palestinian moderate and rational voices through community activities, public outreach and diversifying and expanding the base of support for a comprehensive negotiated endgame settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict". The first lesson is that a rational and broad debate amongst the Palestinian society on all issues is feasible. The second lesson is that using a practical model of solving the conflict is a healthy for a debate and the third lesson is that joint Israeli-Palestinian seminars are more efficient if people are coming from similar backgrounds and age groups. The first two lessons are pre-conditions to run any activity and it is too late to confirm them in 2007/2008.

6 Impact / Outcome

Measuring the impact of a model framework agreement is a difficult undertaking. The external political environment is exogenous and can affect the success of interventions by the two NGOs dramatically. Consequently, it is impossible to identify a perfect cause-and-effect chain.

6.1 Broadening the Peace Coalition

One of the main goals of the GI has been to broaden the peace coalition. In this respect the GI has been successful. It is evident that Heskem and the ideas of the GI are starting to become political mainstream concepts in Israeli politics, though often times still not explicitly. This is exemplified by the switch of Member of Knesset Ze'ev Elkin, who left Kadima – notable the party in power on November 16th 2008 – to rejoin Likud while stating that

"What has happened with this party [Kadima] since 2006 is a total turn-about; it has become a party of the extreme left. What used to be a red line is now a starting point for talks with the PA; in Olmert's case, it is even more than a starting point; he's ready to give in even before the negotiations. Members of the party are talking openly about dividing Jerusalem and a complete return, more or less, to the pre-'67 borders."²⁹

Mr Elkin made this statement two days after Olmert said that Jerusalem will eventually be divided and Israel will return to the 1967 borders with some corrections. In order to put this switch into perspective one has to add that he made his announcement just few months before the new elections in Israel.

It is impossible to directly link the Heskem activities with the change within Kadima. What has been verified is that Heskem has approached a lot of Kadima members of Knesset and that the Israeli government was briefed about the content of the GI prior to the beginning of secret negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

²⁹ Source: Israel National News (<http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/128360>)

6.2 Reference Point

The GIC stated already four months after the official signing ceremony that "[...] it seems that the Initiative has not become a reference point for political discussions in the region, [... while] on the international front, there has been a huge recognition of the Initiative and its merits." There is obviously a distinction between a reference point and the recognition of the merits of something. Evidence exists now that the GI has become a reference point in international diplomacy. Most prominently demonstrated by a speech³⁰ given by Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on July 11th 2009: "The key question is: how can we get a political solution? The parameters are well known: the Clinton Parameters, Taba and even the Geneva Initiative."

Regionally, the picture is slightly mixed. On the Palestinian side, the public discourse neglects the GI while several high-ranking officials are formal or informal supporters of the GI. On the Israeli side, the government does not use the GI officially as a reference point but they are keen on knowing the content, especially with the (almost) completion of the annexes but also before, e.g. the Olmert government wanted a briefing before resuming secret talks with the Palestinians as a result of the Annapolis conference.

In the media, reports on general Israel-Palestinian peace issues (i.e. not articles about a GI event or the annexes) mentioned GI as a sidenote from time to time. A good illustration how the GI became not a reference point but at least be a citable event is a lead article in *The Economist* from August 1st 2009. The content of the article was on Obama's role and position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The writer urges the US president to spell out a detailed version of his vision of a two state solution arguing that he should build on three pillars; the Clinton parameters, the Arab Initiative and the unofficial Geneva Accords.

Overall, an FDFA internal prediction made prior to the signing of the GA on May 27th 2003 stated that "der Vorschlag wird also, einmal unterzeichnet, mindestens ein wichtiger Referenztext sein" was for the most part correct.

³⁰ Mr Solana referred to the GI also prior to this most recent speech, e.g. saying that "the Geneva Initiative is a powerful example of how civil society efforts can help bring back a political perspective, invigorate public debate and show Israelis and Palestinians alike that there are partners for peace on the other side". More generally, the European Union has a section in the FAQ of their homepage (www.delwbg.ec.europa.eu) dedicated to their GI position, stating inter alia that "the European Union also welcomes initiatives from civil societies on both sides, including the Geneva Peace Initiative".

6.3 Sharon's Disengagement Plan

The GI did have an impact on Premier Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to pursue his unilateral disengagement from Gaza, though an undesired one. On numerous occasions Mr Sharon expressed his feeling that he had to come up with an alternative plan. In an interview with the New York Times on April 16h 2004, he said: "Back in November, so many plans were around, from the Saudis, from Geneva, from the Arab League, and I saw we could not resist those pressures without a plan of our own." His statements – and those of his aides – make it clear that the GI did affect his decision, the extent however remains unclear.

6.4 Media Coverage

The development of the media coverage over time is well documented on the Israeli side³¹. After the publicity of the first two years (launching of the GI, Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan) it became increasingly difficult to keep the media attention at a certain rate (table 10). From 2005 to 2006 the reporting decreased by around two-thirds. In the following years, however, the coverage remained fairly constant which can be seen as a success. In 2009, Heskem's friendly leak of the security annexes to the most-read newspaper proves that Heskem has access to the Israeli media. In addition, it is likely that the annual coverage will be higher compared to the previous years.

³¹ PPC is keeping track now of the news reporting and also categorises the article according to the attitude towards the GI but did not provide the same time series data.

Table 10: Israeli media's GI news reporting over the years 2004 - 2009


Year	Newspapers	TV	Radio	Internet
2004	1568	120	259	94
2005	962	220	139	102
2006	299	61	76	76
2007	298	32	80	129
2008	292	32	84	146
2009 (until July)	198	16	37	127

6.5 Polling

Both partner organisations requested external firms to conduct polls on a regular basis. This allowed the two NGOs to get a sense of the public opinion. When it comes to measuring the impact, the value of these surveys is limited. Some questions are inappropriate (e.g. PPC polled election trends two years before the planned next PLC elections and one year before the planned presidential elections) and most others are too general to be any indicator of success. More specific questions are in addition mostly overshadowed by other events, i.e. statistically speaking by noise. An example of this is the attempt to measure the impact of the "partner campaign".

In the first two surveys depicted in figure 14 asked whether the interviewees think that there is a partner while the latter two surveys asked whether Abu Mazen is the right partner. The low "yes"-share in late November 2004 compared to the following three survey results is very likely to be attributed to the leadership vacuum due to Yassir Arafat's death two week before. In general, it is very likely that the Gaza disengagement, Hamas' election victory, Annapolis summit or similar events have such a huge effect that the impact of a campaign cannot be singled out. In addition, the time series is flawed as the questionnaire constantly changes.

Figure 14: "Partner campaign" polling results



The main use of the polling activity is hence to get an idea if it might be appropriate to stop an activity or not –either because there is little hope that a specific programme in question will ever succeed or because most people are supporting it (already).

Both organisations are polling the GI name recognition which can be seen an impact measure of some kind. In general, the trend in the results is not too surprising, i.e. (very) high at the beginning and a decline thereafter. The initial recognition in Israel was found to be 92%, compared with almost 70% in Palestine. The Israeli poll showed an astonishingly high number. No direct evidence was found that the poll was ill conducted but 92% is suspiciously high even taking the mass mailing of the GA into account³².

6.6 Conclusion

As stated at the beginning of this section, the difficulties to find credible indicators measuring the impact are acknowledged. Still it is insufficient for PPC to write in the activities report of 2008 that "the main indicator for success of the program

³² A common polling problem when it comes to check the name recognition is the selection bias of participants. However, no detailed analysis was conducted with respect to this issue.

was the ability to promote the concept of peace, based on the two-state solution, on the elite and grassroots levels." The ability itself cannot be the indicator; there is a need for indicators showing this ability. Impact documentation is also a problem on the Israeli side but in a different way. Heskem employees are able to come up with impact anecdotes but often lack documented proofs. Managing director Gadi Baltiansky's self-proclaimed biggest achievement "has been in clarifying to everyone – both supporters and opponents – what an agreement would constitute for both sides" which is clearly difficult to measure.

Broadening the peace coalition on the Israeli side is a trend in the right direction. The same cannot be said about the Palestinian side. Interviews even suggest that the opposite is happening because of the non-inclusive leadership style of Yasser Abed Rabbo.

The two other major positive success stories of the activities fostering the GA are (i) the GI has become an international – and in Israel also a domestic – point of reference and (ii) the GA annexes which are directly linked to the GA but in parts could also be used for other peace plans in the future.

Overall, the impact is observed although the extent of the causality remains difficult to measure. Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan was officially due to both the Arab Peace Initiative and the GI. The weighting of importance for the decision between the two initiatives cannot be determined. Furthermore, this impact of the GI was not always desired and sometimes ambiguous. For instance, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza could be interpreted as positive impact (GI caused Sharon to withdraw troops and Jewish settlers) and at the same time as negative impact (unilateralism led to a vacuum which was later on filled by Hamas).

7 Assessment & Solution Scenarios

7.1 DAC Assessment Criteria

7.1.1 Relevance

The relevance of the GI evolved in roughly four phases:

1. The GI was initially very relevant in the context of the Camp David and Taba failures and also in the context of the vacuum generated by the second Intifada. Moreover, the existence of only procedural peace plans made the GI relevant. The Swiss support of the two partner NGOs was justified from a relevance perspective.
2. The relevance of the GI declined with the launch of the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and even more so with the Hamas victory in early 2006. The GI became slightly more relevant again with the start of the Annapolis process. The relevance of the GI was retained in general, exemplified by the informal consultation of the GI via Heskem by the Ehud Barak government prior to resuming negotiations with Abu Mazen. Despite Heskem's ability to brief the Israeli government, the Swiss support of the two partner organisations was not fully justified anymore from a relevance perspective during this phase.
3. The election of Barack Obama and his subsequent appointment of George Mitchell as US peace envoy created a need on the American side for elements of a future peace plan. Combined with the relative good connection of Heskem with the new US administration, the GI became highly relevant again as shown also by the US (and Israeli) interest in knowing the content of the GA annexes. Swiss support of the PPC was now much better justified compared to the previous phase while the support for Heskem became absolutely justified from a relevance perspective.
4. It is speculative what will happen once and if an US plan will have been published. It is likely though that the relevance of the GI will decline (inter alia depending on how detailed the plan will be) with most attention being paid to the new Mitchell peace plan. However, the text of the GA and the annexes will most likely remain one of the diplomatic reference points.

7.1.2 Sustainability

The financial support of other donors for the GI and the two NGOs is substantial but without Switzerland's overwhelming core financing, both organisations would not be financially sustainable. There is no evidence that any other donor would provide similar kind of support. The GI idea is sustainable in the sense that the essence of the GA and annexes will continue to be a reference point for future peace negotiations independent of the continued existence of the two NGOs. In addition, the fact that the annexes were almost entirely sponsored by one US citizen (Richard C. Goodwin) proves that the GI can attract other sources of money but only for specific deliverables and not for the full organisational survival of the two NGOs.

7.1.3 Effectiveness

Overall, the effectiveness of the programmes put in place and financed by the FDFA is good on the Israeli side and fair on the Palestinian side. The support of Heskem is justified based on effectiveness considerations. However, not all PPC activities are effective which is why Switzerland's funding is only advised for selected projects. The fact that Switzerland provides the overwhelming share of core funding for both organisations limits Switzerland's ability to support selective projects as well like other donors.

7.1.4 Efficiency

The staff members of both NGOs are dedicated and the current organisational structure allows for efficient processes. PPC's salary payment of Mr Rabbo's security personnel does not generate direct outputs and he has been in need for protection even without his support for the GI. Hence, it appears that this salary payment does not represent an efficient use of financial resources provided by FDFA. The political and security situation in Palestine make the PPC actions less efficient per se but since Heskem is still assessed to be more efficient, a further shift of support towards Heskem could be considered justified.

7.1.5 Impact

The political impact of the GI materialised although sometimes in an undesired way (e.g. Gaza disengagement by Sharon). In Israeli media and to a lesser extent the Palestinian media, the GI is a regular topic. International journalists do remember the accords and cite them in general "peace in the Middle East"-articles too. Overall, the PPC interventions had no major observable impact. Consequently, from an impact point of view, a partial shift of funding from PPC to Heskem could be justified.

7.1.6 Potential for Improvement based on DAC Criteria

Based on the five DAC criteria, we conclude that primary changes are needed in the area of effectiveness, namely

- The polling activity should be reduced overall and ought to be more targeted on directly GI related questions, and should be unchanged over a long time span.
- The reconciliation activities of Fatah and Hamas should not be run by PPC as a stand-alone organisation as there are many Palestinians linking the GI (and for that matter the PPC if known at all) with Yasser Abed Rabbo who often speaks very adamantly against the Hamas. It is doubtful that the GI will benefit from such a polarisation which does not lend itself to reconciliation efforts. PPC could be more effectively promoting the GI in Palestine if acting in conjunction with other like-minded Palestinian NGOs.
- The general broad PR campaigns should be stopped in Palestine. First, because two-thirds of the Palestinians are already in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and second because PPC does not appear inclined to forcefully discuss delicate topics from a GA point of view such as the refugees issue. PPC should instead focus its efforts on GA/GI advocacy work in the Arab world.
- The choice of target groups must correspond to the time horizon of the donors. Programmes with long-term impact horizon should only be continued if the core funding is likely to be provided from a mid- to long-term perspective

7.2 Scenarios of Action

The next three subsections explore the strength and weaknesses of the basic three scenarios of action.

7.2.1 Scenario 1: Stopping the Support

To bring Swiss support of the two NGOs to a standstill has advantages and disadvantages:

- [pos.] The GA and its annexes (three annexes still unfinished) exist and have been brought to the attention of the diplomatic community, some of the decision makers, and the general public. The elaboration of the annexes would outlast an end of Swiss financial support. The money thereby saved could be used for other peace initiatives or could be used by the FDFA to directly capitalise politically on the achievements made so far by the GI.
- [pos.] The annexes can be seen as marking the end of the GA development and it would be a good moment for Switzerland to disengage from the GI in light of shifting importance towards the upcoming Obama/Mitchell plan.
- [pos.] Sunk cost considerations here would mean that Switzerland drops expectations to get benefits from past investments in the GI and instead focuses on possible benefits it could expect from funding GI projects in the future. If this line of thought is applied, Switzerland would be less inclined to invest in Heskem and PPC now since many objectives have been reached within the scope of the initial GI. Future funding could make more sense in the context of a GI+ (enlarged scope based on completing the annexes and focussing on further dissemination and additional peace activities) without providing core funding for the two NGOs.
- [neg.] Ignoring the sunk cost argument above – which is economically justified but sometimes contradicts political goals – then ending support of Switzerland would jeopardize Switzerland from getting the benefits (image and good will) of past years support in the Arab world and world at large.
- [neg.] The built up network by the two partner organisations, in particular Heskem's connections to the US administration, would fade away.

[neg.] Swiss retreat from the two GI NGOs might have a backlash on upcoming Swiss attempts to politically capitalise on the GI.

We deem the option to stop funding immediately to be the least favourable of the three. In case the activities should be stopped due to the assessment above, a well organised retreat is preferable. If the FDFA decides to discontinue supporting the GI, we suggest consulting the FDFA internal alternative support plans from 2003.

7.2.2 Scenario 2: Phasing Out the Support

A FDFA strategy to phase-out its support would best be done within two to three years, i.e. during the self-declared Obama time frame. The phasing out would consist of two steps. First, the two organisations would complete the remaining three annexes, undertake advocacy work in 2010 and second, terminate their activities towards the end of 2011 or if politically more appropriate in 2012. If this strategy will be implemented by the FDFA, we would suggest changing the support for the two organisations in the following way:

- Increase or keep current funding levels in the coming year – may be consider an additional shift of funding in favour of Heskem – but decrease funding subsequently (especially the core funding for both NGOs). In any case, it would be appropriate to give both NGOs clarity on the amount they can expect in the remaining years.
- Urge both organisations to conduct short- to mid-term projects only. In particular, explain and disseminate the annexes to domestic decision makers.
- The international dissemination and explanation in the US should be continued and be lead by Heskem while PPC needs to focus much more on the Arab League. Switzerland might help coordinating activities in Europe in the form of establishing a "GIN-light". The original GIN would probably be too ambitious as stopping the GI NGOs diminishes the credibility of Switzerland's role in the GI.
- Encourage both NGOs to use the time given to them during the phase-out to seek additional funding.

Advantages and Disadvantages

- [pos.] In theory, the option to continue the support beyond the deadline would remain possible and disengaging would be done in a professional fashion. The opportunity to continue support thereafter would have to be announced well in advance as the two NGOs would likely have start to shut down their activities a year in advance or look for alternative funding.
- [pos.] Good peace programmes might be outsourced to other NGOs if the time is used to look for adequate successor NGOs.
- [pos.] Closing the NGOs might help to move the GI closer to track 1.
- [pos.] Mr Baltiansky, managing director of Heskem, signalled openness to a phasing out procedure.
- [neg.] The built-up network by the two partner organisations, in particular Heskem's connections to the US administration, would fade away, although to a lesser extent than if shut down immediately.
- [neg.] A revival of the closed-down NGOs is difficult if not organised well ahead (see above) and the closure might occur when their inputs in the debate would be needed most, i.e. in case the Obama/Mitchell plan would eventually fail.

7.2.3 Scenario 3: Continuation of Support

The third scenario is to continue the support at the same level (or with some reductions). If this strategy would be implemented by the FDFA, we recommend changing the support for the two organisations in the following way:

- An arrangement would need to be found to strengthen the active support in Palestine by broadening the stakeholders of the PPC. We are aware that it is a difficult task to change PPC towards a more open organisation. In addition to the existing PPC persona, the participation of a real independent Palestinian would be desirable; somebody who is no competitor to Mr Rabbo and a member of Fatah. The numerous newly elected Fatah central committee members, some of whom do get along with Mr Rabbo reasonably well, might be worth being considered. This is delicate though as the

GI might also be used by other personalities to further their own political agendas.

- The FDFA should not support the inner-Palestinian reconciliation process through the means of the PPC. Similarly, nation building activities (such as legal training for police officers) should be conducted by other organisations (e.g. the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF).
- More activities should be aimed at influencing Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Here, the PPC could be able to deliver much more. The FDFA might facilitate this by ensuring some contact, e.g. by handing over the annexes. Furthermore, better ideas are needed to really approach and influence the US Jewish community.
- Shift the support slightly in favour of Heskem due to their track record of efficiency and effectiveness. It is important to consider though that shifting the support from one partner NGO to the other has its limits. A certain balance needs to exist between the two. Both partner organisations need the support of the other to organise joint events or events with the participation of the other side.
- The objectives should be revised and modified so that they become measurable. Also defining clearer deliverables should be considered.

Advantages and Disadvantages

[pos.] Switzerland can try to capitalised on the annexes to the full extend possible.

[pos.] The GIN could be revitalised and further political benefit achieved. Many countries already indicated their interest to organise events around specific annexes (e.g. the Spanish and maybe the Canadians on refugees, the United Kingdom on security, the Czechs on water, ...). This could mean further financial participations by other countries and some ownership for them. Switzerland can either try to coordinate regular GIN+ meetings to exchange information or focus on a specific topic – maybe even of an unfinished annexe topic.

[neg.] Switzerland remains exposed in the region and to currently very active organisations, such as NGO-monitor, specifically target foreign funded Israeli and Palestinian NGOs.

7.3 Overall Recommendations

A minority of the evaluators recommends continuation of the GI coupled with an increase of Swiss funding levels comparable to the first 3 years of the GI based on the following considerations namely a) the annexes should be completed and this will need time, financial resources and consistent leadership. Switzerland has been with the GA/GI since the beginning, is a known actor in the GA/GI field and hence could build and expand on acquired good will and know-how; b) The Mitchell team will need time to work out a solution (estimated at 1-2 years minimum) and will depend on supply of technical solutions throughout its mediation efforts. Similar to the FDFA's need of keeping political distance via the GIC and the two NGOs, the Mitchell team might benefit from letting Switzerland together with the two NGOs and other like-minded countries continue and further improve on existing solutions which could become inputs to the Mitchell team and d) political realities on the ground might shift over the next two years e.g. there might be a new government in Israel and possibly a new coalition government in Palestine making implementation of the GI and future improved annexes a likely eventuality. Once the two state solution is implemented and the core of the GI and annexed adopted, Swiss involvement in the GI could stop and the benefits in terms of good-will could be used for other peace initiatives in the region.

A majority of the evaluators recommends phasing out Switzerland's engagement in the course of the next two to three years. The GA is a model framework agreement and hence the ultimate realistic goal is not and cannot be to achieve peace by signing the GA. Either, the upcoming US peace plan will be successful – in which case the GI will gradually become obsolete – or the Obama plan will be a partial or complete failure. In the first case, results should be observable in the time span laid out by President Obama, i.e. in the next two to three years. In the latter and sadly more realistic case, the GA and its annexes will remain relevant. Nonetheless, the process of the Obama plan – if supported by an appropriate campaign by both partner NGOs domestically and by the FDFA and other interested countries on the international scene – will hopefully ensure that the ideas of the GA are common points of reference. This argument suggests that Switzerland should disengage but not in a sudden move. To stop funding immediately would alienate

other donors whose activities depend on Switzerland's core funding of the organisations and would – more generally speaking – be an undiplomatic move with undesired room for interpretations. An organised disengagement is (i) substantively justified, (ii) provides the opportunity to complete, explain, and disseminate the three open annexes, (iii) ensures that both NGOs have enough time to try to find alternative core funding, and (iv) provides enough time to search for alternative organisations that would continue some of the activities (which Switzerland then could still support with project based grants). A well in advance notice of phased-out termination would be advised to be fair to the dedicated personnel of both NGOs who will have time to wind down activities and look for alternative activities.

Appendix A: List of Interviewees

Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Place
Dr Talaat Abdel-Malek	Embassy of Egypt	PEMA Executive Director & Economic Advisor to the Minister	Berne
Dr. Omar M. Abdel-Razeg	Change and Reform List (Hamas)	PLC Member	Ramallah
Qais Abdul-Karim (Abu Leila)	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	PLC Central Council Member of DFLP Politburo. Chairman of PLC Social Affairs Committee	Ramallah
Dr. Amih Al-Abid	Palestine Investment Fund	Consultant	Ramallah
Zion Abu	Heskem	Project Manager	Tel Aviv
Ashraf Al-Ajrami	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestinian National Authority (PA)	Ex-Minister of Detainees & Ex-Detainees Affairs	Ramallah
Rubi Alfi-Hissan	Heskem	Project Manager	Tel Aviv
Hanna A. Amireh	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestine People's Party (PPP)	PLO Executive Committee Political Bureau of the PPP	Ramallah
Barbara Amstadt	Head of Mission	ICRC	Jerusalem
Rolf Trolle Andersen	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Norwegian Ambassador to Switzerland	Berne
Shaul Arieli	Heskem	Geneva Accord Drafter Freelancer Worker for Heskem	Tel Aviv
Qa'is As'ad	Palestinian Peace Coalition		Ramallah
Gadi Baltiansky	Heskem	Director General	Tel Aviv
Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi	Palestinian National Initiative (PNI) Palestine Medical Relief Society	Secretary General (PNI) Director of the Palestine Medical Relief Society	Ramallah
Dr. Yossi Beilin	Heskem	Chairman	Tel Aviv
Dr. Yuval Benziman	Heskem	Director of Research & Policy Planning	Tel Aviv
Peter Buomberger	Zurich Financial Services	Group Head of Government and Industry Affairs	Zurich

Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Place
Conny Camenzind	Representative Office of Switzerland to the Palestinian Authority	Deputy Head	Ramallah
Mario Carera	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)	Head of Office	Jerusalem
Prof. Naomi Chazan	Meretz New Israel Fund Tel Aviv-Yaffo Academic College	Former MK and former deputy speaker of 14th and 15th Knessets President NIF Head, School of Government and Society	Jerusalem
Ray Dolphin	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	High Officer	Jerusalem
Elad Dunayevsky	Heskem	Project Manager	Tel Aviv
Shira Efron	Middle East Bulletin, Middle East Progress	Regional Editor	Tel Aviv
Prof. Arie Eldad	The Jewish Home	Member of the Knesset (MK)	Jerusalem
Nidal Fuqaha	Palestinian Peace Coalition	Executive Director	Ramallah
Rubi Gilly	HESKEM		Tel Aviv
David Glass	Glass-Barsela Law Office	Advocate Legal and Political Advisor to Shas Party	Jerusalem
Thomas Glue	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Economic Security Coordinator	Jerusalem
Martin Griffiths	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)	Director	Geneva
Raia Hameir	Heskem	Project Manager for the Russian-speaking Community	Tel Aviv
Gilly Harpaz	Heskem	Project Manager	Tel Aviv
Dr. Yair Hirschfeld	Economic Cooperation Foundation	Director General	Tel Aviv
Michael Honigstein	Embassy of the United States	Political Officer	Tel Aviv

Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Place
Dr. Arnold Hottinger	Swiss Public Radio, Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Middle East Correspondant	Telephone
Amb. Stephan Husy	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)	Director	Geneva
Brigadier General Jihad	Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Military Secretary of President	Ramallah
Boaz Karni	Economic Cooperation Foundation Heskem	Co-founder of ECF Chairman of the board (Heskem)	Tel Aviv
Prof. Alexis Keller	University of Geneva	Prof. at the University of Geneva GI Supporter and Facilitator	Geneva
Prof. Keith Krause	HEID, University of GVE	Director, CCDP- Graduate Institute, HEID, Geneva	Geneva
Amb. Nicolas Lang	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)	Swiss Ambassador to Ghana	Telephone
Philippe Lazzarini	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Head of Office	Jerusalem
Amb. Aharon Leshno Yaar	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Israeli Ambassador to the UN	Geneva
Philippe Lévy	New Israel Fund	Former Swiss Ambassador	Geneva
Arnold Luethold	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)	Assistant Director, Head of Operations Africa & Middle East	Geneva
Elena Mancusi Materi	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA)	Senior Liaison Officer	Geneva
Eric Marclay	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Senior Deputy, Head of Operations Middle East and North Africa	Geneva
Nicolas A. Masson	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)	Project Consultant 'Palestinian Territories', Middle East an North Africa Programme	Ramallah
Reinhard Meier	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Former Foreign Editor	Telephone

Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Place
Saher Mousa	Palestinian Peace Coalition	Project Coordinator	Ramallah
Khalid A. Naseef	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)	Project Coordinator 'Palestinian Territories', Middle East and North Africa Programme	Ramallah
Hanna Natour	Deloitte & Touche	Manager, Enterprise Risk Services	Ramallah
François Nordmann		Former Swiss Ambassador	Geneva
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Israella Oron	Kadima	Former Deputy National Security Advisor to the National Security Council	Tel Aviv
Amb. Didier Pfürter	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)	former Special Envoy to the Middle East Ambassador to Columbia	Basel
Michal Radoshitzky	Heskem	Director of Foreign Relations	Tel Aviv
Dr. Mahmoud Al Ramahi	Change and Reform List (Hamas)	General Secretary of the PLC	Ramallah
Yorit Rucki-Menasche	HESKEM	Office Manager	Tel Aviv
Talia Sasson		Author of the Sasson Report on illegal outposts	Tel Aviv
Amb. Magdy Galal Sharawy	Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Egyptian Ambassador to Switzerland	Berne
Kim Sitzler	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)	Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East	Telephone
Amb. Roland Steiniger	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)	Swiss Representative to the Palestinian Authority	Interlaken
Stefan Szepesi	Office of the Quartet Representative	Private Sector Development Advisor	Jerusalem
Amb. Dr. Friedrich Tanner	Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)	Director	Geneva
Yonatan Touval	Heskem	Senior Policy Analyst	Tel Aviv
Dr. Daniel Warner	The Graduate Institute Geneva	Director Centre for International Governance	Geneva
Elisabeth Decrey Warner	Geneva Call	President	Geneva
Pierre Wettach	Head of Delegation	ICRC	Tel Aviv
Amb. Theodor Winkler	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)	Director	Geneva

Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Place
Martin Woker	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	Foreign Editor	Jerusalem
Yacoub El Yousef	Deloitte & Touche	Office Managing Partner	Ramallah
Céline Yvon	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC)	Special Adviser	Geneva
Abderrahman F. Zaidan	Change and Reform List (Hamas)	PLC Member	Ramallah
Jamal Zakout	Palestinian National Authority (PA)	Prime Minister Advisor	Ramallah
Amb. Urs Ziswiler	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)	Swiss Amabassador to the USA	Telephone
Orit Zuaretz	Kadima	Member of the Knesset (MK)	Tel Aviv